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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
 
WALLACE & GALE ASBESTOS SETTLEMENT TRUST v. BUSCH: IN 
CASES OF ASBESTOS RELATED INJURY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE OF A DEFENDANT’S SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE AT A 
JOBSITE IS SUFFICIENT FOR SUBMISSION TO THE JURY AND 
FOR THE JURY TO INFER THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS LIABLE 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF’S INJURY. 
 
By: Curtis Paul 
 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that in cases involving asbestos-
related injury, circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s substantial presence 
at a jobsite is sufficient for submission to a jury.  Wallace & Gale Asbestos 
Settlement Tr. v. Busch, 464 Md. 474, 211 A.3d 1166 (2019).  The court 
further held that it is permissible for the jury to infer from such circumstantial 
evidence that the defendant was more likely than not responsible for the 
asbestos products that caused the plaintiff’s injury.  Id. at 489, 1174.  The 
court additionally held that it is not an error to allow a plaintiff to submit 
responsive evidence of the dismissal of a prior defendant under the “opening 
the door” doctrine.  Id. at 498-99, 1180. 
     Between 1971 and 2001, Busch worked as a steamfitter for Honeywell 
Corporation (“Honeywell”).  During his time with Honeywell, Busch worked 
in the construction of Loch Raven High School (“Loch Raven”) in Baltimore 
County.  Busch’s role at Loch Raven was to facilitate the installation of water 
boilers in the boiler room.  To insulate the boiler room, Loch Raven required 
employees to install magnesia-asbestos blocks around the boilers.  Busch 
worked in the boiler room when the magnesia blocks were cut and installed, 
and inevitably inhaled asbestos dust.  Busch was diagnosed with 
mesothelioma in 2016. 
     Busch brought an action for his injuries against multiple defendants 
including McCormick Asbestos Company (“McCormick”), Georgia-Pacific, 
and Wallace & Gale. Wallace & Gale responded to Busch’s interrogatories 
with documentation of a partial billing statement that indicated that it only 
used asbestos-free products in the boiler room. Additional documents 
provided a description of Wallace & Gale’s contracted work as the general 
insulation of surfaces at Loch Raven. Included in the documentation was a 
summary of the total work hours at Loch Raven which showed that Wallace 
& Gale had completed over 4,500 hours of insulation-related work.  During 
pre-trial discovery, Busch identified McCormick and Georgia-Pacific, not 
Wallace & Gale, as the parties responsible for installing the asbestos products 
in the boiler room.  Busch also presented testimony which indicated that 
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McCormick and Georgia Pacific were responsible for installing the asbestos 
products in the Loch Raven boiler room. 
     During the trial, Wallace & Gale admitted into evidence Busch’s 
complaint against the seven original defendants.  Responding to this new 
evidence, Busch requested that the trial court allow him to submit evidence 
of McCormick’s dismissal, which the court permitted.  At the close of 
evidence, Wallace & Gale and Georgia-Pacific were the only remaining 
defendants.  The jury found in favor of Busch and awarded a total verdict of 
$14,568,528.33.  The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed the 
judgment and held that there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury that 
could infer that it was more likely than not that Wallace & Gale was 
responsible for the asbestos products used in the boiler room.  The court 
further affirmed that it was proper to allow Busch to present responsive 
evidence of McCormick’s dismissal from the lawsuit.  Wallace & Gale 
successfully petitioned to the Court of Appeals of Maryland for a writ of 
certiorari on both the trial court’s and intermediate appellate court’s rulings. 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland examined whether the circumstantial 
evidence of Wallace & Gale’s substantial presence at Loch Raven was 
sufficient for submission to the jury.  Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement 
Tr., 464 Md. at 480, 211 A.3d at 1169. Additionally, the court examined 
whether the jury could permissibly infer from such circumstantial evidence 
that Wallace & Gale were responsible for Busch’s injury, even though there 
was no direct evidence linking Wallace & Gale to any asbestos products in 
the boiler room.  Id.   
The court began by discussing the Maryland standard for bystanders injured 
by asbestos products. Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Tr., 464 Md. at 
487-88, 211 A.3d at 1173-74. A bystander plaintiff must show that the 
defendant’s asbestos products caused their injury by showing: (1) frequent 
use of the product; (2) that the plaintiff worked near the harmful product; and 
(3) that they were regularly exposed to the product.  Id. at 487-88, 1173-74 
(citing Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 210, 604 A.2d 
445, 460 (1992)).  The court stated that a plaintiff claiming harm from an 
asbestos product must produce evidence that it was the defendant’s product 
that caused his injury.  Id. at 488, 1173-74 (citing Reiter v. Pneumo Abex, 
LLC, 417 Md. 57, 71, 8 A.3d 725, 733 (2010)). 
     The court next examined whether Busch had presented sufficient evidence 
to show that Wallace & Gale was the party responsible for the installation of 
the asbestos products in the Loch Raven boiler room.  Wallace & Gale 
Asbestos Settlement Tr., 464 Md. at 488, 211 A.3d at 1174. The court found 
that the evidence that Wallace & Gale was primarily responsible for general 
insulation, and that it had completed over 4,500 hours of insulation related 
work, indicated that it was more likely than not the party responsible for all 
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of the asbestos-related work at Loch Raven.  Id. at 489-490, 1174-75.  Based 
on such evidence, the court found that it was permissible for the jury to make 
the inference that Wallace & Gale was therefore responsible for performing 
the insulation work in the boiler room, and therefore it was more likely than 
not Wallace & Gale’s products that harmed Busch.  Id.  The court was not 
persuaded by the lack of direct evidence linking Wallace & Gale to any 
asbestos products in the boiler room.  Id. at 490-91, 1175-76.  The court was 
additionally unpersuaded by the testimonial evidence which indicated that 
McCormick, not Wallace & Gale, was the party responsible for the asbestos-
related work in the boiler room.  Id. at 492, 1176. 
     The court next discussed whether the trial court erred when it allowed 
evidence of McCormick’s dismissal from the suit to be heard by the jury.  
Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Tr., 464 Md. at 492-93, 211 A.3d at 
1176-77.  The court reviewed the trial court’s decision in light of the “opening 
the door” doctrine.  The “opening the door” doctrine will allow a party to 
submit responsive evidence when otherwise inadmissible evidence is injected 
into a case by the opposing party.  Id. at 496-99, 1179-1180 (citing Little v. 
Schneider, 434 Md. 150, 170, 73 A.3d 1074, 1085 (2013)).  Under this 
doctrine, the court found that the trial court did not err when it allowed Busch 
to submit responsive evidence to Wallace & Gale’s submission of Busch’s 
original complaint.  Id. at 498-99, 1180. 
     The dissenting opinion, while not commenting on the second issue of the 
admission of new evidence, disagreed with the majority’s ruling on the first 
issue.  Wallace & Gale Asbestos Settlement Tr., 464 Md. at 499-504, 211 
A.3d at 1180-83.  The dissent argued that there was no evidence that linked 
Wallace & Gale to any asbestos products used in the boiler room, and 
therefore the jury merely speculated that Wallace & Gale was the party 
responsible for the products that harmed Busch.  Id. at 499-500, 1180-81.  
The dissent emphasized that in all cases of asbestos-related injury the 
foundational requirement is that the plaintiff must show that it was the 
defendant’s product that caused his injury.  Id. at 500, 1181.  The dissent 
argued the majority did not recognize this foundational requirement and 
allowed the jury to impermissibly infer Wallace & Gale’s liability from its 
generalized presence at the Loch Raven jobsite.  Id. at 501, 1181.   
     In this case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that in cases involving 
asbestos-related injury, circumstantial evidence of a defendant’s substantial 
presence at a jobsite is sufficient for submission to a jury, and that it is 
permissible for a jury to infer from such circumstantial evidence that the 
defendant was more likely than not responsible for the asbestos products that 
caused the plaintiff’s injury.  The court therefore eased the burden of proof 
for asbestos injured plaintiffs by allowing circumstantial evidence of a 
defendant’s substantial presence at a jobsite to support both the proof of a 
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plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos products as well as the proof that the 
defendant’s products harmed the plaintiff.  Wallace & Gale Asbestos 
Settlement Trust will be a useful case to many asbestos injured plaintiffs who 
may have previously been unable to attach liability to defendants due to a 
lack of direct evidence linking their asbestos-related injury to the defendant’s 
product. 
 
             
       
   
   
 
 
